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Chapter 1: Introduction
‘We arc in a collapse. We are broke.”
]or”c Remes i.cnicov Ai-gentine Economic Minister, hiiuun'y 6, 2002^
Argentina was the belle of international financial markets throughout the i990s and had turned
itself into a model of economic success in Latin America, an example for all other countries to follow.
Touted as one of globalization's successes, the economy grew by 54% in less than a decade as a result of
the adoption of neo-liberal policies and the enactment of reforms like the privatization of national
industries and a hard-currency peg. The future was looking up for a country that had known better
times, but like all good things, that time was about to end. Starting in 1999, Argentina entered a period
of economic recession from which it would emerge a changed nation.

The economic situation in Argentina continued to worsen and by October of 2ooi,
unemployment in Argentina had reached above i8% and 38.3% of the countr/s urban population was
living below the poverty line.

In order to prevent devaluation of the country's currency, the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) loaned Argentina billions of dollars and attached certain policy
prescriptions to improve the country's economy and keep it from defaulting on its massive debt. A zero
deficit law was enacted to prevent government over-spending, and the country re-structured its debt.

Most important were the continued loans, or rescues" by the IMF. These loans, first
implemented in January of 2001, were valued in billions of dollars. The first, a $14 billion loan package
over three years, was followed in September with another rescue worth $8 billion. These loans filled
the national treasury with foreign currency used to prop-up the Argentine peso, whose value was
directly tied to the value of the US dollar. By November of that year, the country's foreign reserves
were back to pre-rescue levels, a result of the massive outflow of capital by Argentine citizens.
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In an effort to stem the wave of bank withdrawals,the government implemented a program
called the corralito (Spanish for "small corral"). This meant that millions of Argentines were unable to
access their savings. The corralito restricted bank withdrawals to only 1,000 pesos per month. Designed
to save the fragile banking system. It only infuriated citizens who could not get the money they needed.
All sectors of Argentine society were being hurt, and middle class Argentines who before had lived a
very comfortable life under convertibility, now only had money for bare necessities.

Due to these decreased standards of living in a deteriorating economy, Argentines all over the
country,from La Rioja to Buenos Aires began to march in protest and government buildings were
destroyed. On December 19,2001, people went into the streets of Buenos Aires protesting the
government. President De la Rua responded by imposing martial law on the city, which only infuriated
the middle class more. Over the course of the next day,16 people had died In the protests. Economic
minister Domingo Cavallo resigned that day, but that was not enough to satisfy the people. De la Rua
finally had to offer his resignation and left the Casa Rosada, the Argentine presidential residence, by
helicopter.

De la ROa's departure did not placate the people or help the countr/s poor economic situation;
the restrictions on access to capital remained, and there were more protests during Christmas of 2001.
The lack of a Vice-President meant that Ramdn Puerta, the provisory President of the Senate, was next
in line to succeed President de la Rda,and he became interim president on December 22. Puerta did
not want the job and served only as long as it took for a new president to be selected by Congress. Two
days later. Congress chose Rodriguez Sad as the new President of the Republic of Argentina. A potential
candidate for the next Argentine presidential election. Sad was a former provincial governor of San Luis
province. Located in the center of the country, he had created a soiid record of economic improvement,
it was with this background that he took the Presidency, aiming to turn around the country's economic
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misfortunes and put the country back on the path it had walked during the 1990s. Within days Sa^
suspended Argentina's enormous debt payments and attempted to introduce a new currency,the
Argentino^ His plans were cut short by his feWow Justicialisto party members, who were against the
changes Sa^ endorsed and subsequently removed their support from his government.*

More protests began to erupt in the streets, and, on December 28, protestors created a gridlock
in downtown Buenos Aires and set small fires in the Congress building after a number of them managed
to break in. Many were angry at the cotrolito and wanted access to their funds. After Sad s resignation,
Ramdn Puerta was once again in line to assume the presidency; however,the situation was so bad in
Argentina that Puerta resigned rather than become President again. With his resignation, Edwardo
Camafio,the leader of the Chamber of Deputies, assumed power for the next two days until a new
successor could be chosen. Finally,former governor of Buenos Aires province and failed presidential
candidate Eduardo Dulhalde was selected to be interim president by the legislature. He was the one
who took the fateful step to devalue the peso and default on the country's debt. This was the climax of
a crisis that was still far from over. On January 6,2002 the Argentine peso was devalued from 1 peso
per dollar to 1.4 pesos per dollar, and it continued to fall throughout the next year,finally reaching 3
pesos per 1 dollar. Dulhalde stayed in power from January 1,2002, until May of 2003 when elections
were held and Nestor Kirchner was elected President.*

There have been many competing interpretations of the currency crisis. Some argue that the
cause was political and that Argentine politicians and the political system was the root of the problem.
Others point to external forces, like the International Monetary Fund,as being instrumental in causing
the crisis and yet other interpretations say that the cause is a mix of economical and political, of
domestic and external factors with no predominant cause. This thesis will look at two ways to analyze
the crisis —as the story of macroeconomic mismanagements and as a story of crisis in domestic political
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institutions- to try to offer a more complete avenue to understanding the crisis. It will attempt to
answer 'What caused the crisis of 2001?” by offering multiple perspectives and reconciling them.
Accordingly,the thesis is divided into three parts. The first part is a macro economic analysis of the
country's recent history,the second a look at its domestic politics, and the third and final part a review
of various interpretations of the crisis as well as a synthesis of the macroeconomic and political stories
into an alternative view.

In chapter two of this thesis, a macroeconomic history of the country is constructed using
various indicators to show the trajectory of the Argentine economy from the 1980s up until the currency
crisis. What emerges from the chapter is a division of Argentine macroeconomic developments from
the 1980s until 2001 into three distinct phases. The first are the 1980s, which saw a grave economic
crisis. This is followed by the early 1990s, when the implementation of the currency peg under the
Menem administration created temporary macroeconomic stability. The last phases are the years
leading up to the currency collapse, which saw a gradual but clear deterioration of the economic
conditions. The economic indicators used cover a range of areas from inflation to trade balance. The
chapter attempts to contextualize the quantitative evidence with a discussion of major events with
impact on Argentina's economy,such as external economic shocks or the privatization of industries.
This provides the base to better understand how political decisions were made and how the changes
and state of the Argentine economy affected these decisions.

Chapter three of this thesis examines the political forces at work in the country as well as its
recent political history in order to understand how the country slid into the political crisis that
accompanied the economic collapse. The federalist make-up of the country,the political parties, and
the administrations of the three presidents to rule Argentina from 1989 to 2001 are the background with
which to understand the crisis. It will show the decisions of the country's politicians and how these
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were affected not only by the economy of the country, but also how structural and political forces
entered into the equation. The chapter looks at historical structural problems in Argentine politics,
which became clearly apparent under President Alfonsfn's term in office (i984“89)* Next, the chapter
highlights some of the characteristics of President Menem's first administration (1989-94), which include
a time of political stability, but also of presidential imposition and extreme political compromise.
Finally, this chapter illuminates how Menem's actions in his second term (1994-99), which, were in fact a
struggle for political survival, aggravated the impending crisis.

The final chapter looks at competing explanations for how the country could scale great heights
in the mid-1990s and then plunge into such deep crisis within a few years. The causes of the fall are
examined: did the Argentine political system, individual politicians, the country's own political
structure, external factors such as the International Monetary fund or poor economic policies send the
country into ruin? To frame this analysis,the views expressed in economic literature,journals, and
newspapers, as well the views of Argentines themselves, are used to build a panorama of possible
causes. Finally, a combination of politics, macroeconomics, and external factors are all examined to
explain how the crisis came to be using the macroeconomic and political analyses from chapters two
and three.
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Chapter 2: A Macroeconomic Story
In order to create a macroeconomic picture of Argentine during the time of convertibility, one
must also create that same picture for the time that preceded it. This chapter does both, it shows the
recent macroeconomic history and that history is divided into three periods: pre-convertibility, early
convertibility, and late convertibility. Each "era" is distinct in the Argentina it portrays. First a struggling
economy, second an amazing period of economic growth and stability, and finally a period of decline.
whose portents went unheeded by policy makers.

The 1980s were a time of crisis for Argentina, whose economy struggled to reduce
hyperinflation and a large external debt. In order to control this situation, several programs were
implemented throughout the 1980s. A variety of currency reforms were implemented with the goal of
fixing inflation and stabilizing the economy. With each new system, the Argentine government
promised to practice restraint and reform. These programs had little effect on Argentina s problems
with hyperinflation. International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans were ineffective due to the inability of
Argentina to adhere to the prescriptions put forth by institutions like the IMF.

With the election of Carlos Menem in 1989, the economic picture did not change much. It was
not until he appointed a new economic minister, Domingo Cavallo that improvement came. In 199I/ the
Law of Convertibility was implemented along with the privatization of previously nationalized
businesses. Argentina's economy had a problem with runaway inflation, a result of an ever-increasing
money supply. By limiting the printing of money to only the amount in pesos that it could back up with
dollars, the central bank of Argentina could no longer print money at will to cover deficits. In effect, the
government attempted to control inflation via monetary policy (implementing a fixed exchange rate) in
order to increase stability. These measures brought about an economic stability unknown to the
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country in many years; however, as the years passed, the economy began to gradually decline. This
economic worsening would not be fixed until after the crisis of 2001.®

Economically, the Argentine crisis of 2001 can be examined via several indicators to give a
better, overall picture of what was going on during the build-up to devaluation. In addition to indicators
that directly affected the currency peg, like inflation, external debt and GDP are both indicators that are
very telling in Argentina's situation. For example, while Argentina's GDP grew during the 1990s,so did
its external debt and this hindered the country's ability not only to pay off the debt, but also pay the
interest on the debt.^ Argentina's economic well-being was also affected by how well it could export
goods. Trade with other nations has been an integral part of the country's economy, and, as the 1990s
progressed, foreign financial crises hurt trade. Another indicator, Argentina's balance of payments,
shows revenue flows in and out of the country, which includes foreign reserves (an important factor in
maintaining convertibility). These indicators, overtime, give a bird's eye view of the development of the
Argentine economy during this time period.

Source: Based on World Development Indicators(WDI)2004
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Inflation -the increase in the cost of goods over time- greatly affected Argentina throughout the
1980s and into the early 1990s by devaluating savings and discouraging business investment. In the
1980s Argentina experienced harmful, wildly fluctuating inflation rates of at least 100% per year (at an
average of 566% per year over the decade), well above a desirable, normal level of only 1-3% per year.
During this period, the country tried a number of currency reforms in an attempt to control inflation.
The first program introduced the "peso argentine" In 1983 where one new peso replaced 10,000 "old
pesos," then, in 1985,the Austral Plan introduced the austral, which was worth 1,000 "new" pesos. The
ineffectiveness of these plans led to the creation of the currency peg.

Once the currency board had been put into effect in 1991/ inflation in Argentina dropped
dramatically (from 2,313% to 24%)after a period of inflation of more than 50% psr month, which is
known as hyperinflation. The Inflation rate continued to fall from that point each year that the peso
maintained parity with the dollar. As a result, between 1991 and 1993/ inflation rapidly decreased.
Between the years of 1996 and 1999/ the peso experienced another period of deflation, falling to
negative 1.8%. This decade of low inflation rates was very much in contrast to the rates in the 1980s.
Inflation in the years Immediately following devaluation was not as bad as the 1980s, with the highest
levels in the reaching only 25.8% in 2001 and then proceeding to fall rapidly following two years to only
4.4% in 2003. Since 2001, inflation, while higher than under the convertibility law, has not gone back to
the hyperinflation of decades past. Economic growth was high In the years after devaluation, bolstered
by high grain prices. Promising as this recovery" has been, it will only continue If investment in
Argentina continues.

The exchange rate was a much watched Indicator prior to the currency peg as its value on a
given day or even hour could be different from the previous day or hour by a large amount(especially
true during the 1980s). The levels of inflation in Argentina during this time are related to the exchange
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rate. When the inflation rate was high, so was the exchange rate. The value of the Argentine peso is
undermined by high inflation, making the peso worth less.

Figure 2.2 Exchange Rate
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During the 1980s, the Argentine peso was floated, which is to say the world currency markets
determined the peso's value and its value against the US dollar fluctuated wildly. In the case of
Argentina, the peso lost value. This low demand for Argentine currency was caused by a weak economy,
large trade deficits, and an overall poor investment environment. The exchange rate fluctuated severely
in the 80s, falling as low as two million pesos per dollar in 1983 (alternatively, the next year it rose to 17
pesos per dollar). The 1980s was a volatile time for the peso. Exchange rates rose significantly over
previous decades. By the mid-1980s, the exchange rate with the dollar had risen, but, by the late 80s,
the exchange rate skyrocketed upwards again, as it had done in the early part of the decade, in 1989,
the black market exchange rate was somewhere around $3/650 Argentinean pesos per US dollar.

To increase economic stability and the value of the peso, Argentina implemented a pegged
exchange rate, where it declared that the peso would be tied to the performance of the dollar, and that
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$iUS would be equal to $iARS. The implementation of the fixed exchange rate went into effect on April
1,1991 and from then on fixed the exchange rate directly to the U.S. dollar. The Argentine government
would have on hand as many dollars as it printed pesos in order to insure value. Fiscally, a plan to
Improve tax collection (historically laxly enforced) was implemented, and tax revenue increased 43% in
1991'°. This exchange rate lasted from 1991 until December of 2001, when the peso was devaluated and
went back to being a floated currency. After devaluation, the value of the peso doubled in the first
trimester of 2002 to 1.98 pesos per dollar and by the second trimester 2002 went up one more peso. In
effect, devaluation tripled the value of the dollar against the peso In less than one year.

In addition to private sources of credit(from banks and individuals, usually in the form of
bonds), a government like Argentina's could use international lending agencies. One purpose that the
Argentine government used these agencies was to build up hard currency reserves. The country's
foreign currency reserves dictated how many pesos the treasury could print. In the act of borrowing
money,the government can stabilize (for the moment)its economy with the help of these agencies, the
principle ones being the World Bank(WB)and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development(IRDB), otherwise known as the
World Bank is a special agency of the UN whose purpose is to provide "low-interest loans, interest-free
credit, and grants to developing countries,

The International Development Association (IDA), also a

part of the World Bank, provides low interest loans and credits, but to the poorest of developing
//« The other
countries in order to boost their economic growth and improve people s living conditions.
main International lending agency,the IMF, is slightly different in its mission; It provides loans to
countries in the midst of balance of payment problems. By providing general funds with no specific,
mandatory function, a country (such as Argentina)can use these funds to stabilize Its currency or rebuild
currency reserves, though still carry some policy reform conditions. A high level of borrowing from
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these sources can indicate that a country is experiencing financial problems and is unable to secure
loans from more traditional sources.

Source: Based on WDI 2004
Argentina's external debt slowly but steadily rose in the 1980s, though throughout the majority
of the decade WB loans remained relatively low. Argentina experienced a financial crisis during the
1980s; inflation was out of control and WB loans increased by 25% (from $500 to $2,000 million)
between 1984 and 1987. The amount lent per year leveled off at around $2 billion per year until 1993From 1994 onward, Argentina experienced a steady rise in the amount of credit received, peaking at $9
billion in 2001. In 2002 these loans and credits started to decline.

Argentina received more loans towards the end of the 1990s In an effort by international
lending organizations to stabilize the country and prevent default. Most notably was the IMF s blindaje,
or shield, of $14 billion, implemented at the start of 2001. The idea was to lend Argentina a large
amount of money in order to restore peace in financial markets and calm the nerves of worried
investors. Mixed with this aid were prescriptions for policy change so as to put the country back on
track.
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Argentina received its first IMF loan in 1983/ and in comparison to the World Bank loans, which
steadily increased, the loans from the IMF followed a more erratic pattern of increase during the 1980s,
at first going up to almost $4 billion and then down to the current WB levels of $2 billion by 1993* This
change can be tied to the Argentine economy In the 1980s, which during the bad times had to turn to
13

the IMF for help (most notably a 15 month stabilization plan started at the end of 1984)*

Starting in

1994/ IMF credits steadily increased in amount during the mid'i990s. In 1997/ at the height of the Asian
financial crisis, IMF loans decreased, deviating from the path taken by the WB,and started to go down
and continued to do so. With the region still reeling from the effects of the 1999 Brazilian real
devaluation and signs of an impending default, the IMF dramatically increased its loans In an attempt to
prevent Argentina from defaulting on its loans. The result was an increase of 176%,from $5 billion in
2000 to almost $14 billion in 2001. The WB did not follow suit and decreased the amount lent in 2002.

Debt, while a problem throughout the 1980s, would become a much more serious issue after
the currency peg. To encourage the use of the peso and to instill actual value in it, private loans could be
Issued either in pesos or dollars, though many times they were issued in dollars. So after almost ten
years of acquiring debts and taking on loans,to devalue the currency would be disastrous for the
country's citizens and businesses. Loans taken out in dollars would have to be repaid in either dollars (a
problem after devaluation)or devalued pesos. Another problem was the convertibility plan in itself.
Most of Argentina's external debt was in dollars, and to pay that, the country had to dip into its foreign
reserves. These dollar reserves were the same ones that backed up every peso issued. At the same
time, Argentina was not reducing its debt. It continued to sell bonds to the international market and
take out loans from the IMF and World Bank.’"^
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Figure 2.4 External debt, total
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Argentina's external debt -the money the government has borrowed from foreign sourcesgrew in the 1980s and 90s as it began to borrow heavily from foreign financial institutions in order to
finance public works projects and social services. As the debt mounted, so did the interest. Argentina's
obligation to service its debt diminished the amount of money in the budget available for other
expenditures like healthcare or defense.

Throughout the 1980s, Argentina's external debt rose every year, averaging $3-5 billion per year,
until 1992. 1991 and 1992 were to be the years of Argentina's smallest amount of debt (as a percentage
of GNI) for the whole decade of the currency board. Starting in 1993/ its debt began to rise each year,
averaging an increase of $9.7 billion per year until 2000, at which point the external debt began to
decrease. The change in the average annual increase of Argentina's external debt was dramatic, almost
tripling between the two decades. In 1994, the external debt started growing at a rapid rate until
devaluation in 2001. This debt aggregation took place alongside unfettered state spending; with the
onset of devaluation at the end of 2001, the government had to suspend payments on its debt and
default on its loans
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As Argentina began to pile on debt, its International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating began to
improve. The system,somewhat counterintuitive, examines how much risk a country carries. Risk in
this sense is the risk associated with investing in another country. The confusing part is that as the
actual amount of risk falls, the risk rating increases, so that the higher the score, the less risk associated
with investing in the country.

Source: Based on WDl 2004
The ICRG rating is a system used to examine how much risk a country carries. There are three
parts to a country's ICRG composite rating. The first and most heavily weighted (100 out of a total 200)
is the political rating. This indicator speaks to how stable a government is via statistics from a country
like corruption, political stability, and general law and order. The second part is a country's economic
risk rating. This part, worth 50 points, scores a country on its GDP growth, inflation rate, and annual
balance of payments account. The final part is the financial risk associated with a country. This section,
also worth 50 points, looks at the risk factors such as exchange rate stability and a country's total
foreign debt {as a percentage of GDP). The highest ranking is 100, which would indicate a very low risk
country. Zero, being at the other end of the spectrum, would indicate a country with a very high risk
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factor for investment. The ICRG composite ranking can be higher or lower depending on the type of
involvement one wishes to have in a country. Overall, it is a good way of looking generally at a country
in terms of the risk associated with investment there.15

Although Argentina was considered a "high" to "moderate" risk throughout the 1980s and early
90s, its composite risk score was valued "low" risk by 1993/ signifying that Argentina was a low risk
investment opportunity. Argentina's risk rating rose most of the years that convertibility was
maintained, despite the fact that it was borrowing heavily and not curtailing its spending. This meant
that Argentina was seen as a good investment opportunity when in fact, as history tells us, it was on the
road to devaluation.

While country risk was low throughout the I990s,there were still warning signs to the
impending default. As early as 1998,the IMF recognized the dangerous situation Argentina was heading
towards. While the IMF realized potential problems, individuals and private firms did not. Argentine
16

bonds, while risky, compensated with higher interest rates that attracted foreign investors.

Beyond investment risk, Argentina's economy was affected by Its balance of payments, which is
partly related to trade in that, of its pieces, exports and imports play a significant role In its calculation.
It is more than just a trade surplus or deficit. A country's balance of payments is also calculated by using
available foreign reserves. These reserves would become an important factor in the maintenance of the
currency peg.
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Source: Based on INEC
Argentina's balance of payments maintained a positive level under the convertibility plan.
Initially, it rose with the implementation of the currency peg; Argentina's balance of payments fell in
1994; the year of the Mexican tequila crisis. The balance began to rise again between 1995 and 1997;
peaking at $5.6 billion before starting a rapid decline affected by a recession that started in 1999 and
also from the effects of Brazil's own financial crisis that year. By the end of 2000, and almost the end of
the convertibility plan, the balance of payments had turned negative and continued its decline for
another year. By 2002, while still a negative $2.6 billion, Argentina's balance of payments started to rise
again. The main contributing factor to the decline in the overall balance of payments was a decline In
the current account (exports, imports and net current transfers).^

“ Argentina's "balance of payments", encompasses all international transactions with other countries, businesses,
etc., during a set time period. It includes all incoming and outgoing payments from Argentina. This is derived from
the current, capital and financial accounts of a country, though the latter two are often combined as one. The
current account is comprised of international trade, net investment income, and unilateral transfers. The capital
account is the currency or capital transfers through national borders. The financial account is the selling or buying
of foreign assets, such as Foreign Direct Investment, in addition to determining the level of foreign reserves held;
something that was integral to the maintenance of Argentina's currency peg. Argentina's foreign reserves were
deeply taxed by devaluation, becoming a negative $12 billion the year of devaluation.
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This could be explained, in part, by a decrease in exports to Brazil (a major trading partner) after
Brazil's own currency devaluation made Argentinean goods very expensive. Brazil is Argentina's largest
trading partner. Throughout the late i990s and the early 2000s, exports to Brazil averaged 27% of total
exports, with only Chile and the United States coming close to Brazilian levels. Argentina also imported
23% of its goods from Brazil during this time, more than from any other country. It is for this reason that
the relationship between the two economies is so important. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, the
performance of one economy can be very good or very bad for the other country. This was most
apparent in the adverse economic affects brought on by the 1999 Brazilian real devaluation and one of
the reasons trade Is important to consider when looking at the overview of an economy.

Source: Based on WDI 2004
For the majority of the 20 years leading up to devaluation, Argentina's GDP followed the same
path as trade, even though trade only accounted for around 20% of GDP. Throughout the 1980s,
Argentina's GDP stayed constant at around $200 billion per year, and decreased during periods of high
inflation. With the implementation of the currency peg, GDP, like many of the other indicators, began
to increase each year. The only exception was 1995, the year after the Mexican tequila crisis. Recession
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hit In 1999 and GDP began to fall, rising only again with the devaluation of the peso (and a marked
increase in trade as a percentage of GDP).

The effect of trade on Argentina's GDP was somewhat constant throughout the past twenty
years, changing dramatically only recently with the devaluation of the peso. Throughout the 1980s,
trade followed no real pattern as it stayed mostly constant,though there were two dips in 1985 and
1989, years which were also marked by large increases in inflation, which would have made Argentinean
exports much cheaper, and thus more desirable. Trade grew during the years of the currency peg, and
by 1998 became responsible for 23% of Argentina's GDP. Trade stopped its steady growth and declined
by a small bit with the onset of a recession in 1999, but by 2001 and the devaluation of the peso,trade
accounted for over 40% of the GDP because the lower prices created demand for Argentinean goods
abroad.

Macro-economicaily,the country went through three distinct phases. The first was the hyperinflated 1980s where a number of economic remedies were tried, though none found success. In
response to this, at the beginning of the 1990s, newly-elected President Menem helped create the
convertibility plan as a way to make the country economically stable. During this time period. Inflation
was down,the exchange rate steady, GDP was up and the country was considered a low-risk investment
opportunity. As the 1990s progressed, the stability was still there, but the economy began to gradually
worsen. The external debt began to grow each year and the country's balance of payments began to fall
and the late 1990s served as a warning of what the future would hold for Argentina.
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Chapters: A Political View
"Menem behaves as if he were ashamed of his deionist past"
-Anlonio Salcedo, /:7 Informador, I'ebruary 22, 19‘-)()'’^
During the time of convertibility^ politics was not business as usual in Argentina. Political
ideologies were changed as well as the manner of doing business.

During the 1990s, politics were very

give and take between the executive and legislative branches. Political relations mirrored the phases of
economic performance. They improved with the implementation of convertibility, yet the era of
recession and poor economic performance was the same period when reelection and political survival
became the goals of the executive.

Based on the 1853 constitution (amended several times), the Argentine government is
comprised of three branches of government,judicial, legislative and executive. These branches have
been suspended during the country's periods of military rule (1966-1973 and 1976-1983/ for example).
The legislative branch has a bi-cameral congress. Argentina's political make-up played an important role
in shaping its economic policy during the era leading up to and during the convertibility law. The
country's politics are influenced by its framework, that of federalism, established by its constitution. It
creates two levels of government: the national and provincial governments, with the former having
supreme power over the latter. This does not mean the provinces are without power. They are
autonomous, providing services such as the administration of government and education, and
guaranteeing the rights of its citizens. Additionally, the provincial governors can exert a considerable
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amount of influence in national politics. The country is set up in a federal system. There are 23
different provinces and the autonomous district of Buenos Aires. Each province has a governor and
legislature and operates fairly independently of the national government.
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Currently, the lower house,the Chamber of Deputies, has 270 members, and the upper house.
the Senate,72. In 1994/ the Constitution was amended to mandate that one third of government
positions be held by females. The executive branch is comprised of the president, vice president and
appointed ministers. The president can serve a maximum of two,four-year terms. Both the Chamber of
Deputies and the President are popularly elected. The judicial branch is comprised of a Supreme Court
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and the lower courts. Judges are appointed by the president pending ratification by the Senate.

The Judiciary has had two roles since the return of democracy in 1983- Initially it was an
impartial and independent body, placing checks on presidential power. This was to change under
Menem's administration. Starting in 1989, president Menem wanted a Judiciary that would not
challenge him, and eventually accomplished this (after a failed attempt to secure the resignations of the
majority of the Justices) with by packing the court. Immediately upon taking office, he passed through
Congress a resolution to increase the number of Justices from six to nine. His replacements were either
close friends or ail had an ideology that the Judiciary was to go along with the President. This resulted in
increasing the power of the Executive as it gave him more freedom to enact policy with fewer potential
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checks.

Though banned during the period of the "dirty war"(1976-1983)/ historically there have been
two major political parties in Argentina. The first and most iconic Is the Partido Justiciaiista (PJ, also
known as the Peronist party), created by President Ju^n Per6n during his ascension to power in 1945The Peronist party also had socialist tendencies under Peron. Promoted as an alternative that was not
capitalist or communist. It supported nationalization and socialist class-politics. The party was deemed
illegal between 1955 and the early 1970s, at which point it was renamed the Partido JusticiUsta. During
the military government of 1976-1983,the PJ was banned, yet recovered with the return to democracy
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and when Carlos Menem took back control of the government in the 1989 presidential elections.
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The other party. Union Civica Radical(UCR, also known as the Radicals), Is the offshoot of the
Union Civia party,from which the Radicals split in 1890. Throughout the twentieth century, there have
also been several minor parties, many of which have presence in only one province and are the main
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opposition party.

The Radical party achieved its first national victory in 1916 with the election of

President Hipolito Yrigoyen. It espoused moderate socialist ideas (like the redistribution of wealth and
nationalization). When Juan Peron came to power in 1946, the UCR became the main opposition party
in Argentina and supported the coup that ousted Peron. The part split in the 1950s into two separate
parties, the Intransigents and the People's Radical party, with the latter becoming the UCR of today in
the 1970s. This is one example of the party's history of intra-party conflict. Raul Alfonsm became the
first Radical president in 17 years after the country returned to democracy in 1983. In 1997, it allied itself
23

with the new FREPASO party to form Alianza, which won the presidency in 1999-

Table 3.1
Election Results in the Diputados Nadonales
Year

Winning Party

%

Seats

1983

Union Civica Radical

47-97

129

1985

Union Civica Radical

43-2

63

1987

Justicialista

41-46

60

1989

Justicialista

44.6

66

1991

Justicialista

40.22

61

1993

Justicialista

42.46

64

1995

Justicialista

43.03

68

1997

Justicialista

36.36

50

1999

Alianza

43-7

63

Source: Atlas Electoral de Andy Tow
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Candidate selection plays an important role in party politics, and thus the politics of Argentina.
This selection can take a variety of forms. One way is the selection of a candidate by a powerful
provincial governor or a consensus of several important province-level party members with no
opposition. At other times candidates for political office can be selected by an assembly of party
members. Candidates are sometimes chosen from competing party lists. All primary elections for office
are administered by the parties, and not the government. Being chosen to run instead of going through
a party primary can be affected by the presence of a strong governor who can control things like
employment, budgets and other privileges. This gives him the necessary clout to impose his will at the
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provincial level.

How well the President can effect legislation, even with a majority in the legislature, is affected
by the national parties and the federal system in Argentina. Compiling enough support within the
legislature or even Inside of the President's own party requires a large amount of effort to build
consensus for policies. The national parties are decentralized and oftentimes internally pluralistic with
little internal debate about party program issues, that is to say debate over policy not fitting with party
Ideology. This pluralism derives from the strength of local political leaders. The selection of candidates
is based on clientelism and patronage. Political programs do not have to coincide with national party
Ideology provided that other incentives, like supplying basic goods, are given.

Federalism also acts as an important restriction In the exercise of presidential power. The
provinces carry a lot of political clout, providing many of the basic services to their constituency and
employing large numbers of public servants. They also receive large amounts of their budgets from the
national government; on average, over 50% of provincial expenditures were paid for out of the national
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government's coffers in 1999-

One of the biggest reasons for this system is that the national
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government does the majority of the revenue collection for the nation. The other is that many public
services are provided by the provincial governments. This revenue sharing system is called
coparticipacion and was established in 1988, and through it the majority of funds collected as national
taxes are redistributed to the provinces. As a result, these funds can be allocated based on political
inclinations In a discretionary manner. Coparticipacidn has encouraged fiscal irresponsibility In the
provinces which oftentimes go into debt in order to finance public works projects, a staple of some
regions' economies. Additionally, some debt in the provinces accrues as the result of competition inside
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of a political party to lead it at the national level.

In this light, the Argentine federal system is much more competitive than cooperative. The
provinces do not compete with each other in order to attract investment via creating favorable
investment environments; they Instead compete with each other for the national government's
disbursement of funds. This competition for money is aimed at financing provincial political leaders in
order for them to secure office and rise within the party ranks. The already present situation of
clientelism, strong provincial governors, and pluralistic politics reinforces this competition, which in turn
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has had negative effects on the Argentine economy.

Prelude 1983-1989: The Alfonsm Years

Elected after seven years of authoritarian military rule, Raul Alfonsfn, a Radical, was inaugurated
in December of 1983- He inherited a country whose economy had been steadily deteriorating since
1981. This economic picture did not change with the return to democracy, and In 1985 Alfonsfn's
government started the Austral plan. This plan instituted price freezes, wage Increases, exchange and
Interest rate devaluation. The plan also halted the practice of printing money to cover deficits -one of
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the chief contributors to the country's rising inflation- and introduced a new currency,the Austral.
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Alfonsin and his party swept the 1985 congressional elections, a resounding initial success. This
short-lived period of economic stability began to destabilize only a few months after it started. Inflation
began creeping back up, caused in part by a drop in the price of one of Argentina's chief exports, grain.
As things worsened, social and worker groups began protests, and the UCR lost in the 1987
congressional elections.

As the 1989 presidential elections approached,the question of who would be nominated by the
UCR and PJ was not quite answered. For the Radicals, Alfonsm anointed Eduardo Angeioz, a more
traditionalist Radical, as his potential successor. Inside the PJ, two possible candidates emerged; the first
was Antonio Caflero, governor of Buenos Aires, who had become an advocate for modernizing and
democratizing the government. The other candidate, Carlos Menem, was based more in traditional
Peronist ideas. He attracted groups from all sectors,from big business to labor unions and the Church,
and finally won the PJ's support to be its presidential candidate in 1988. The main difference between
Angeioz and Menem was that Menem promised a return to traditional Peronism where the State would
take better care of its citizens, and Angeioz could only offer more of the same -reductions in wages and
state spending.

In addition to the tensions added by an election year,there were several other major events
that happened right before the 1989 elections. At the end of 1988, a military uprising, a terrorist attack
on a military barracks, and widespread electrical brown-outs all occurred. In February of the following
year, the peso was devalued and inflation rose to over 3,000%. It came as no surprise then that Menem
and the PJ handily won the 1989 elections. With continually rising Inflation, supermarkets began to be
looted and President Alfonsin was forced to transfer power to the new Menem government six months
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earlier than expected, on July 8,1989.
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'able 3-2
Timeline of Economic Ministers,1989-2001,
Presidents Menem and de la RCia
Jul-89

Miguel Roig

Jul-8g

Nestor Rapanelli

Dec-89

Antonio Erm^n Gonzalez

Jan-91

Domingo Cavallo

Aug-97

Roque Fernandez

Dec-99

Jose Luis Machinea

Mar-01

Ricardo Lopez Murphy

Mar-01

Domingo Cavallo

Sources: Pang, BBC

President Menem igBg-Si
President Carlos Saul Menem,an ex-governor of the La Rioja province in northwestern
Argentina, was elected in 1989 and sworn in a full six months early (July 9/1989 instead of December
1989) due to social unrest and a volatile economic situation. Elected on the PJ ticket. President Menem
campaigned as, and seemed to actually be, a politician who embraced old-style Peronism. Once In office
and faced with the realities of the failures of AlfonsiVs government and the poor economic situation
the country was in, he broke from traditional Peronist ideology. Menem announced an economic
opening, or apertura, that would liberalize markets and privatize state-owned enterprises. He split from
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his party and aligned himself with neo-llberalists, anti-PeronIsts, and "big business.

As a result of his divergence from Peronist party ideology, the party became divided Into three
groups. The first, "bandwagoners," were those in the party who went along with Menem,the strong
executive. The second were those categorically opposed to the ideological split the president had made
with the party. The third group,"the creditors" was a mixture of the previous two groups, neither fully
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supporting the new turn Menem's government had taken yet giving it a bit of leeway in order to solve
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the economic problems, like hyperinflation,that were plaguing the country.

Menem continued to aggravate his party during this time period. In December of 1989/ at the
height of a period of hyper-inflation,the government's alliance with Argentine conglomerate Bunge y
Born (a pairing aimed at lending credibility to the new government's reforms) broke apart, and Menem
chose not to placate PJ party members by appointing party leaders to fill this gap. Instead he appointed
a friend and former cabinet member of Menem's La Rioja provincial government, Antonio Erman
Gonzalez, an example of the clientelism inherent in Argentine party politics. As a result, 20 Justicialista
members left the party in protest, and for the rest of the time period (until mid-i99i)/ PJ members
publicly criticized almost every aspect of the government. They spoke ill of the reform movement.
Menem's alliance with the right, and the betrayal of his party. Even the wing of his party that supported
him,the bandwagoners, began to criticize the president.^^

As a result, Menem went through a period of distancing himself from the PJ, going so far In 1990
as to say, "If I have to govern without the party, or if the party splits, so be It. As time passed,the
voices of discontent grew even louder within his party, going so far as to yell at and heckle his newly
appointed economic minister, Domingo Cavallo, out of Congress during his first visit in February of 1991.
The discontent of the PJ spread to the general public. PJ voters who supported the government's
economic policies dropped from 70% in September of 1989 to just 27.9% in June of 1991- This discontent
felt by the PJ in relation to the executive spread to other branches of the government. The Argentine
congress, controlled by the Peronists, became a large obstacle to reform implementation in this period.
Many of Menem's proposed reforms, like the privatization of ENTel,the national telephone company, or
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Aerolinas Argentinas,the national airline were met with Inaction and obstinacy.
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Privatizations, while not new to Argentina (the last military government privatized a few
enterprises towards the end of its rule), became common during Menem's administration. One of the
biggest reasons for privatization was the fact that many of these industries were very inefficient and
drained state resources. These privatizations also helped eliminate some of the national debt and
added to the country's currency reserves. Generally,the Argentine government kept a minority stake in
the sold-off companies(~iO%)to distribute to employees. By the end 1993/ 64 State Owned Enterprises
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(SOEs) had been privatized, reducing the external debt by $13.4 billion.

Table s-a"
Major Privatizations in Argentina since 1990
Firm

Sector

Date

Telecom Argentina

Telecoms(ENTel North)

Nov 1990

Telecom Argentina

Telecoms

Mar 1992

Telefbnica de Argentina

Telecoms(ENTel South)

Nov 1990

Telefonica de Argentina

Telecoms

Dec 1991

AeroUneas Argentines

International airline

Nov 1990

Toll roads(9,800 kms)

Concession

1990-1994

Railways (concession)

1991-1994

Oil Oolnt exploration rights)

1991-1992

Oil (concession)

1990-1992

YPF-refinery

Oil

1992-1993

YPF

Oil

Jul 1993

YPF

Oil

Dec 1993

Central Puerto & Central Costanera

Electricity generation (Bs As)

Apr/May 1993

Central Puerto

Electricity generation (Bs As)

Nov 1993

Central Costanera

Electricity generation (Bs As)

Dec 1993

Ferrocarriles Argentines (former)
YPF-main areas
YPF-secondary areas

Multiple instances of the same company indicate different buyers or a private buyer and an IPO
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SOMISA

Steel

Oct 1992

Edenor

Electricity distribution (North)

Dec 1992

Edenor

Electricity distribution (North)

Dec 1995

Edesur

Electricity distribution (South)

Aug 1992

Edesur

Electricity distribution (South)

Dec 1995

former Gas del Estado

Gas distribution (8 companies)

Dec 1992

Transportadora del Gas del Norte

Gas transmission (North)

Dec 1992

Transportadora del Gas del Norte

Gas transmission (North)

Jul 1995

Transportadora del Gas del Sur

Gas transmission (South)

Dec 1992

Transportadora del Gas del Sur

Gas transmission (South)

May 1994

Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro

Insurance and savings bank

Feb 1994

Distributora de gas metropolitana

Gas distribution

Nov 1994

Petroquimica Bahia Blanca & Indupa

Petrochemicals

Oct 1995

Source: Goldstein
Due to Menem's political isolation, he had to find ways to bypass Congress. This was
accomplished via declarations, specifically "Decrees of Necessity and Urgency"(DNU). In total, Menem
issued 178 DNUs, but the majority of these were in his first five years of power, with the most(95)in
1991. These DNUs were an example of the power invested in the Executive under Menem. It was these
first few years that Menem had the least amount of support from his party and therefore had to rule by
decree much more than when there was a cooperative congress and he had party support. Another
example of the wall between the Executive and Legislative was the manner in which the privatizations
were carried out. Some of the first enterprises privatized, like ENTel, were privatized very quickly with
almost no competition. The political isolation and economic difficulties in the country were impetuses
for the government to try these measures and escape from the conventional wisdom at the time that
35

the government was inactive.
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In addition to the PJ"s iack of cooperation with the Executive, Menem faced other obstacles in
his government. In late 1990,a scandal erupted within Menem's government. Brought to light by U.S.
Ambassador Terrence Todman and labeled "Swiftgate" after the company involved. Swift Foods, it
involved solicitation of bribes by government officials with regard to privatizations. A number of highranking cabinet members were involved in the scandal. Though not the first scandal to happen in
Menem's presidency (several ministers were accused of directly benefiting from the privatization of
firms), it was the most damaging. Instead of being contained nationally,the involvement of a foreign
power (the United States) and the close ties Menem's government maintained with the U.S. created
36

more serious repercussions.

As a result, his entire cabinet resigned and there were allegations that the

complaint filed by the U.S. ambassador was leaked by those in government who wanted to persuade the
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government to repeal certain reforms.

With the resignation of his entire cabinet, Menem made some changes to his cabinet, the most
Important being the reassignment of his former foreign minister, Domingo Cavallo, to economic
minister. It was Cavallo that started an aggressive reform program, based in the Convertibility Law of
1991. This law mandated that the Argentine treasury could only print as many pesos as it had dollars or
gold in reserves, effectively making the peso equal to one dollar. The point was not to dollarize the
economy; its aim was to instill actual value in the peso. From this basis, Cavallo built his other economic
reforms such as the continuation of privatizing state-owned enterprises, renegotiation of external debt
and tax law reform^®.

The Good Years: 1991-1995

With the Convertibility Plan came stability, and with stability Menem^s government could
proceed with its program of privatization and reform with greater ease. Cavallo also privatized In a
much more efficient and less corrupt manner than had been the case in previous years. For example,
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Maria Julia Alsogaray, who was in charge of ENTel's privatization, crafted a hasty plan that did not offer
competitive bidding. Cavallo reworked the plan, and the company that Alsogaray's team valued at $400
million fetched over $1.22 billion. There was similar success in the selling off of national industries such
as oil (YPF), utilities (gas, electricity), and other enterprises. Not only did these privatizations reduce
national expenditure, Cavallo engineered these sales so as to reduce the national debt. Buyers could
swap their Argentine debt for shares of these enterprises and netted the government $i3-4 billion in
external debt reduction by the end of 1993.^®

President Menem,in addition to his economic success, began to receive party support from the
PJ. In the reassignment of ministers after the Swiftgate affair, Menem appointed party leaders to head
the ministries of social services. He also updated the Peronist ideology, arguing that Peron himself
would have taken the same path. Additionally, Menem granted the PJ autonomy,and this was most
apparent In relations with the provinces. During this time Menem (for the most part) did not Interfere
in provincial affairs and vice versa. This meant that while the national government and Cavallo could not
force the provinces to take up more economically sound financial practices, Menem could count on the
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support of, or at least the absence of overt challenges to his rule from, PJ provincial governors.

This support was also apparent In Congress. Although not always fully, the PJ controlled
congress frequently supported proposals by Menem. In turn, Menem began to channel legislation
(usually privatization proposals)through the congress instead of legislating by decree, as he was wont to
do during his first two years in power. By giving the legislature an opportunity to play an active role in
the privatizations via small modifications, Menem was able to carry out his reforms and build consensus
at the same time. This participation also played into the clientelist nature of Argentine politics (as
opposed to when Congress had no say) and gave the PJ legitimacy. With this party unity from both the
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PJ and smaller parties, Menem even overcame the UCR's opposition to the reform movement.
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From the early to mid’i990s,the PJ gained ground in both national and provincial politics. By
1993/ the UCR,the Peronist's only nation-wide political competition, lost control of the federal district of
Buenos Aires and controlled only four other provinces. Grassroots political movements failed to gain
momentum,and traditional political counterweights such as unions and workers groups were ineffective
in mobilizing against the government. Menem enjoyed the support of the military, the Church, and the
United States, and it was In this environment that he began his work at amending the Constitution and
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getting re-elected.

Before 1994/ Argentine presidents were constitutionally limited to one six-year term. In addition
to changing election rules, Menem wished to reform the constitution In general, but to do this, he would
need two thirds approval in Congress. This meant he would have to ally himself with the UCR,as the PJ
did not have that kind of majority. In the end,to get the support, a number of factors came into play.
The first factor was the internal divisions in the UCR at that time. Secondly,the politics of the provinces
came into play, with UCR governors -who were dependent on the national treasury- willing to support
Menem. Finally, Menem threatened to use the Supreme Court(packed with his appointees)to approve
a proposed law to reinterpret the constitution. In the end, Menem got what he wanted, albeit after
some compromise with UCR leader and former president Alfonsin. The agreement, known as the Olivos
Pact, changed presidential terms,from one six-year term to two four-year terms(Romero 300-4)Additionally, the Olivos pact changed more than just presidential terms; It changed power balances in
the federal system. The system benefited from this and also was put at a disadvantage. It gained by
making Buenos Aires an autonomous district and thus strengthening the provinces, but then also hurt
the system (or at least the power of the provinces) in that senators were now directly elected instead of
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elected in provincial legislatures.
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All was not to be rosy for Menem's next term. In what came to be called the 'Tequila Crisis;
Mexico devalued its currency, also called the peso, in the second half of 1994- At first, many in the
international investment community thought that Argentina would soon follow in devaluation, and
initially It seemed like they could be right. Yet, despite a massive outflow of Investments from the
country, the government stuck to its convertibility plan and did not devalue. Though Argentina
weathered the storm economically, politically, trouble was to come. After the 1995 elections, political
relations between the president and legislature began to worsen, which had the effect of prolonging the
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recession brought on by the Tequila crisis.

Downfall: 1995'-1999

Menem won the presidency in 1995 with more than 50% of the vote. A new party coalition.
FREPASO, won 30%,and the UCR, only 17%. In the eyes of the people,the UCR still had not overcome its
failures of the 1980s and the success of the FREPASO demonstrated the discontent some had with
Menem's administration, though this was not enough to grant total victory

Though Menem and the PJ achieved success in the 1995 elections, there were still problems, and
soon,things in the country were to worsen. Unemployment had been growing, a result of the
Convertibility Law, staying firmly between 16 and 17 percent. Additionally, as a result of the 'agreement'
between the executive and the provinces, provincial reform (such as decreases in spending) was not
being swiftly implemented. Menem also faced political difficulties. As the economy began to encounter
problems (such as the effects of the Mexican tequila crisis), PJ politicians began to look for scapegoats to
satisfy their political bases. Who they chose was someone allied with foreign creditors and the IMF, and
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not with traditional Peronism: Domingo Cavallo.

Cavallo ran into problems with PJ legislators and other party members in the government in
respect to legislation and some of the privatizations. The privatization of the postal system in particular
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inserted Cavallo Into an already occurring public dialogue about corruption. Cavallo alleged one of the
interests in the soon to be privatized company was involved in illegal activities. This of course was just
one of many public corruption scandals already taking place, with members at all levels of government
being implicated. Reacting to suggestions that he himself was also involved in corruption, Cavallo
claimed that even President Menem was involved in corrupt practices. Of course, this was to be the end
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of Menem and Cavallo's relationship, and, in July of 1996, Cavallo was removed from office.

Cavailo's replacement, Roque Fernandez, did not escape the political problems that caused the
downfall of his predecessor. Though the minister had changed,the country's economic plans did not.
Fernandez continued privatizations and concerned himself with the generation of revenue in order to
keep up income with government expenditures. In trying to do this, he encountered political resistance.
Each tax increase or layoff of public servants had to be fought over with the legislature; In effect he was
trying to keep money in the government coffers. This was even more important since elections were
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coming up In 1997(and then again in 1999)/ and It seemed like the opposition would win.

As the economy became less robust than it had been during the first Menem administration,
workers and unions began to organize In protest against the direction of the country^s economic
policies. The General Confederation of Labor(CGT)and other labor unions joined together to hold
several strikes In 1996 in response to changes in labor laws. Political opposition increased as well.
FREPASO and the UCR encouraged citizen's protests in response to the unchanging economic situation.
The Catholic Church, which had initially supported Menem in his first bid for the presidency, began to
withdraw support as well. Additionally, teachers unions, workers in towns affected by privatizations and
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lay-offs, and the unemployed began striking and protesting in the streets.

The PJ was also experiencing some internal strife as well. President Menem began to develop
aspirations for running for another term, even though prohibited by the newly reformed constitution.
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There were others in the PJ who wanted to participate in government and not let the party be
dominated by Menem, most notably the governor of Buenos Aires province, Edurado Dulhalde^®. The
two political figures began an internal battle inside of the party, with Menem and Dulhalde both holding
plebiscites for reelection in different provinces. By 1999, it was clear that Menem was not going to be
able to run for president, but his campaigning hurt Duhalde, who was unable to build consensus within
the party. This gave the opposition, FREPASO and the UCR,a chance at success. In 1997,the two joined
together in the Alianza para la Justicia, el Trabajo y la Educacion, also known as Alianza and won in the
1997 congressional elections. Facing the 1999 presidential elections,for which the PJ was not prepared,
Alianza began working on a candidate that both parties supported, eventually settling on the mayor of
Buenos Aires, Fernando de la Rua. The 1999 election results were almost like those in 1989, except that
the PJ lost out. Alianza received ten percent more than the PJ in presidential elections(48.5% in total)
and won the Chamber of Deputies. The PJ, while defeated was still not powerless; it retained a majority
in the Senate and control of 14 provinces.'

In Menem's quest to be elected for a third term, he not only hurt his party politically, but he also
neglected the well-being of the economy. He no longer took interest in the new proposals from his
economic minister, due to the fact that most of these proposals were harsh and could adversely affect
the economy,and thus damage relations within his party and hurt his chances for re-election. As a
result, in 1998, Menem did not increase taxes and increased spending, both against the wishes of his
economic team. This led to an Increasing debt at all levels. Provincial governors followed suit(though
none more so than the government of Buenos Aires, where spending increased 61% between 1995 and
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1999) and a majority of the increase in spending went to patronage via public sector employment.
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Devaluation

That Alianza won such a victory did not mean that it was going to be easy for De la Rua or the
coalition. He faced a corruption problem that had gotten out of control under the Menem
administration. In addition to "Swiftgate," there were other scandals and the use of position for
personal enrichment. "Yomagate" involved a Uruguayan drug dealer, who after his arrest by Spanish
authorities implicated members of Menem's family and several provincial governors in money
laundering schemes or drug trafficking. Many people in power,that is to say Menem supporters, also
took advantage of privatizations to enrich themselves, and, as in "Swiftgate," a number of public figures
S3

were forced to resign.

Additionally, the economy, which had been In recession previous to de la Rua's election,
continued to under-perform and was hit with external shocks, most notably the devaluation of the
Brazilian real and the overvaluation of the peso, both of which hurt Argentine exports. The external
debt had been rising throughout the ten years of the previous administration, reaching $132 billion by
the end of 2001. De la Rua was also faced with the largesse of the Menem administration, which
involved generous transfers of money from national coffers to the provinces to spend as they deemed
fit.®^

To combat some of the problems, de la RCia brought back Domingo Cavallo as minister of the
economy in March of 2001. It was thought that he would be able to work the same magic that brought
the country out of the economic problems of the 1980s. This was not to be the case. The problems that
plagued Fernandez, Cavallo's replacement under Menem, had not gone away. While Alianza had won
the presidency, the PJ still controlled both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. When Cavallo
attempted to get his economic restructuring packages passed through congress, he was met with
resistance and veto by PJ congressmen. The PJ did not want to give any form of assistance to the rival
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Alianza government. This went beyond the national government, and provincial governments were also
against these reforms and policies, especially one which required the cutting of state workers' salaries.
ss
an unpopular move in a place where populism and ciientelism was so prevalent.

This two decade period of Argentine politics was very diverse, with Presidents Alfonsm, Menem,
and de la Rua taking different paths to achieve not only political success, but also economic success.
though not necessarily getting either. Factors such as party politics and federalism played a role in who
succeed and failed. Additionally, the system of convertibility closed off some options for politicians
when dealing with economic policy. Argentina's cllentelistic politics, in the end, diverted attention away
from the problems of the country in the last years of convertibility and towards creating political gains at
the expense of the Argentine economy.
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Chapter 4: Explanations and Causes
"...Lo lake one oj the two definitions. One was an ordered exit from convertibility,
('.ieai'ly there are pal i I iea l-eeonom ic reasons that would make it very difficult:
when on(' is at a \’erv (j(H)d party, no one wants to leave too early."
-Gui lU'i-mo Pei'i'y, Clarin, August 2S, 2002^®
The question of who or what caused Argentina's financial crisis does have a clear cut answer.
Three main views of the crisis have emerged. Some critics charge that large international lending
organizations, and yet others find no overwhelming singular reason. Other critics say that it was
Argentina's own doing, its politicians enacting bad policy and its political structure, that of federalism
and that the national government's relationship with the provinces was the cause. Finally, a hybrid view
is taken by yet others, mixing a variety of different factors to explain the crisis. This brings about the
question,"how did this happen?" Which analysis most correctly identifies the contributing factor(s) to
the fall of peso convertibility? To answer that question, an overview of the prevailing explanations must
be examined.

The first explanation for the 200i currency crisis finds cause with the international financial
community; Institutions like the IMF had a role in the crisis. The IMF supported the currency peg 'til the
end, with several multi-billion dollar rescue packages aimed at preventing loan default in the two years
leading up to devaluation, even though some at the Fund knew this was not sustainable. This support,
in effect did less for economic stability as it provided more for capital flight. It also had the effect of
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severely increasing Argentina's debt load.

American economist Paul Krugman points his finger at the IMF and the United States. The IMF
actively encouraged free-market,"globalization" policies, and Argentina went along with these whole
heartedly, many of which were explicitly endorsed by the American government. While acknowledging
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that the crisis was based in Argentina's monetary policy, he does not use this to absolve international
financiers, instead comparing them to medieval doctors and their policy prescriptions, lots of austerity.
as bloodletting -not exactly an effective cure for the nation's ills. The "sensible" cures, like an orderly
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devaluation, were never taken seriously by the IMF,and thus Argentina found itself in crisis.

Many Argentinean politicians have blamed the IMF and International financial Institutions for
causing the crisis. Former president Raul Alfonsfn placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of
international banks, saying that they should have increased deposits to counter the massive cash
withdrawals immediately before devaluation.^® Current president Nestor Kirchner has also placed
responsibility of the 2001 crisis on the IMF,saying that it had not taken responsibility with respect to its
role in the crash.60 Criticizing commentators at the Wall Street Journal, who put the blame on both the
IMF and the Clinton Treasury, Domingo Cavallo said:
"When Argentina's economy suffered as a result (of the Brazilian real devaluation),
the IMF then recommended its other patent medicine - austerity and higher taxes
to close its 'budget deficit.' While there certainly was a budget problem, austerity to
//61
solve recession is self-defeating, not to say idiotic.
The IMF's Internal Evaluations Office released a paper in 2004 detailing the organization's
actions throughout the decade in reference to Argentina. In the end, it came up with 10 lessons to be
learned for the IMF and Its interpretation of what caused the devaluation. The IMF acknowledges its
role, saying in the report "the IMF on its part, supported by its major shareholders, also erred in failing
to call an earlier halt to support for a strategy that, as implemented, was not sustainable." Yet, in that
quote, it still attempts to skirt off its responsibility. The report held the Argentines responsible for the
majority of the problem, blaming the failure of the economy on the shortcomings of Argentine policy
makers. One of the biggest areas in which the report finds fault with the Argentines is the area of policy
implementation. Politically, the Argentines did not support their own policies as well as they should
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have, and this weak support Influenced the IMF to not push for the ending of convertibility as early as it
should have.62
The second school of thought is that the Argentinean government did this to itself. These critics
point out a variety of reasons to support their theory,from privatization to corruption,the crisis Is a
result of Argentine governmental actions. The corruption In Argentine politics and its clientelistic nature
gave rise to inefficient spending and use of public funds for personal gains. Tax evasion was prevalent
among many Argentines,thus contributing to smaller amounts in national coffers that could be used to
pay off its growing debt. Rodolfo Windhausen, an Argentine freelance journalist, has charged President
Menem of being a dictator due to his strengthening of the executive branch and refusal to leave power.
The sale of privatized industries contributed to Increased debt and unemployment, both detrimental to
the economy. The Argentine government is also found to be at fault for its internal politics, with
Peronist politicians failing to cooperate with de la Rub's Alianza government.
Rodolfo Windhausen, views the crisis as a failure of Argentine politics. He states that
corruption and the Inability of the government to borrow what it could repay and keep spending in
check created the country's current economic problems. This has been a problem inherent in Argentine
politics at the least since Alfonsm and the return to the democracy. In the 1980s,the political climate
was such that President Alfonsin borrowed billions of dollars from the IMF to prop up state industries
and finance the budgets of the provincial governors who shared party affiliation (a legacy of the
country's Peronist past). Debt was accrued at the national level in order to gain political power and
votes. Beyond political pressures, Windhausen states that structural institutions, like the law of
coparticipacion, were used to influence both national and provincial politics. When Menem assumed
the presidency,few things changed. Corruption was as rampant as ever during his administration, and
his manipulation of the constitution to stay in power made him more a dictator than an elected official.
When de la Rua became president, the harmful cycle of Argentine politics did not stop, as partisan
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provincial governors blocked legislation to alleviate the country's debt.^^ Argentine politics were thus
Windhausen's main culprit In the creation of the 2001 crisis with the federalist structure playing a minor
role.64

An Economist article published shortly after devaluation identified two core Argentine causes.
The first is the currency board Itself, which was supported by Argentine politicians. The other is politicai
corruption and the Ineffectiveness of politicians. The rigid adherence to the currency board eventually
led to recession in 1998 as a result of Its inflexibility in response to external shocks. Though the currency
board prevented the government from printing pesos at will, the government gave out bonds as if they
were money, and this led to an increased external debt. President Menem,the Economist argues, did
not try to counter this as he was occupied with figuring out a way to change the law in order to run for a
third term. Combined with corruption and lax tax collection, government spending did not always go
towards the betterment of the country, instead many times going to the provinces that had little
incentive to use the funds prudently. De la Riia's government was also ineffective, which faced a PJcontrolled congress and a series of ineffective economic ministers, finally returning to Domingo Cavallo,
who did more harm than good. The article states that he "forced" the IMF to give the government a
series of multi-billion dollar loans to stave off devaluation and seriously hampered the country's fiscal
situation by tainting Central Bank autonomy with the removal of its director.

In effect, the article

found that Argentine politicians were at the core of their problems.

In a round-table interview in Argentine newspaper Clarfn In August of 2002, well-known
Argentine and Latin American economists Guillermo Calvo, Guillermo Perry, Ricardo Hausmann, and
Federico Struzenegger gave their views on what caused the crisis. Economics was the theme of the
interview, and the 2001 crisis was almost exclusively analyzed using macroeconomic indicators, such as
the fixed exchange rate, weak fiscal policy, the deficit, and the trade balance. Political decisions and acts
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were largely left out of the discussion with the exception of Social Security reform being cited as a
contributor to the crisis. These economists stated that external factors(that is to say, interference by
the IMF, etc.), were partially to blame as capital fluidity played a role in the creation of the crisis, but the
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institutional framework and the country's fiscal problems were also mentioned.

The Argentine people themselves mainly criticized their own government and did not look to
the IMF for blame. In a poll by the Argentine newspaper Clarin taken six months after the crisis, 76.2%
of the people in effect blamed their politicians for the crisis. Carlos Menem and his decade of rule
(44.6%), corruption (40%), and the unfinished Alianza administration (29.2%) were the top three
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reasons blamed by the Argentine people for the crisis, with the IMF being blamed by only 5%-

The third view on what caused the crisis finds both external forces like the IMF as well as the
Incompetence of the Argentine political system and Its actors responsible. Shortly after the crisis, the
Economist put out an article which found no singular reason for default, but instead a combination of
external factors(IMF)and Argentine politics. It criticized the IMF for trying to implement austerity
programs in Argentina that were too strict and for allowing the country to maintain a poor fiscal policy;
however, it offered these criticisms with a caveat. While the IMF received a bad reputation for its
actions in Argentina,the IMF has received negative feedback on almost all of its rescue packages. The
article states that if the IMF gives too much aid, it is not seen as upholding its agreements with other
member nations, but if the IMF gives too little aid, it will be blamed for ruining that country's economy.
There Is a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" mentality,that no matter what the IMF does, it is
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most likely to be criticized.

One explanation by Charles Calomirls in the CATO Journal, the publication of a libertarian think
tank In the US,for Argentina's crisis finds that a number of factors were responsible for the crisis but
starts by saying Argentina had set itself up for default. By creating the currency peg to control state
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spending, default was an eventuality. Menem's privatizations created new sources of government
income which of course drove up expectations of economic growth, but his inability to control
government spending in the end raised the national debt severely. Interestingly enough, Ricardo
Hausmann actively sold Argentine debt during the convertibility period as chief economist of the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB). The IDB, in addition to the IMF, prescribed tax increases which hurt
growth as a condition for Its help. Analysts then began to look at how debt swaps could turn a short
turn profit as long-term economic possibilities were Ignored and independent research by private
investment firms failed to challenge the conventional wisdom so that their own firm could help
underwrite the debt swaps. When Argentina's economy collapsed, the IMF wondered why the markets
were so unstable. CalomIris argues that had the IMF not been so complicit in Cavallo's 2001 plans that
tried to avoid devaluation totally, then perhaps the crisis would not have happened. The article states
that had the defaulted, with the support of the IMF, and with sufficient government reform and if the
IMF financially supported the currency peg as the country reorganized its debt, it could have avoided the
collapse seen at the end of 2001. The claim is not that there has been plenty of evidence for an
emerging market like Argentina to avoid such a crisis, but that the domestic forces will not enforce the
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correct fiscal policies to avoid crisis in the long run.

Another analyst, Harvard economist Martin Feldstein, also finds multiple causes for the crisis.
Devaluation earlier In the decade (1998-2000) would have had less disastrous effects on the economy,
yet officials were reluctant devalue the peso for a variety of reasons. Due to the history of hyperinflation
In Argentina, the government was wary of changing the currency peg for the fear of a return to the days
of hyperinflation. There was also an issue of debt. Effectively, all the debts that accrued over the
decade were in dollars and would have to be paid back in depreciated pesos and this would put
additional strain on businesses and individuals. Finally, there was always the possibility of the dollar
losing value in relation to other world currencies and thus making Argentine exports more attractive.
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Though the Argentine government had its faults, the IMF contributed as well. According to Feldstein,
these policy choices carried known risks, yet the IMF in its advisory role continued to support these
knowing their harmful impact and the benefits that a floating exchange rate could have. The IMF did
force contractionary fiscal policies as a condition of continued aid, but these policies were also a
requirement In the maintenance of the peg. What the IMF failed to do with its opportunity to effect
change was that of coparticipadon reform. Reforming revenue laws could have had a greater effect on
preventing the accumulation of debt than what was recommended by the IMF. Finally, the IMF enabled
Argentina to continue working under the status quo by giving the country loans, and this discouraged
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real change.

The claims that the Argentine government brought these economic Ills upon Itself or that the
country was just another victim of the merciless machine of globalization evaluate the reasons for the
crisis too simply. The Argentine government certainly was not enacting policy without external
influence; the international financial community influenced these decisions. Likewise, the IMF and
other organizations did not single-handedly design the country's downfall through ineffective policy
prescriptions. The best and most comprehensive way to examine the crisis is in effect to factor in all of
the causes,the Argentine domestic actors, and the IMF/international financial community.

In terms of who or what is aligned In each of the three categories, where the different actors are
not as clear-cut as one might imagine. To begin with,the IMF does not admit responsibility, although it
acknowledges that the timing of its actions was poor and that there are some lessons to be learned. The
majority of these lessons concentrated on better adherence to IMF policy, more surveillance based on
macro-economic Indicators, and currency peg specific guidelines for the future. Only two of the lessons
to be learned from the Argentine experience were related to political factors like institutional
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weaknesses and the insufficiency of country ownership of IMF programs, while the rest concentrated on
macroeconomic factors or procedural changes.

Other arguments for blaming the international financial community fail to look enough at the
economics and are quick to blame the IMF. As in Paul Krugman's explanation, he condemns the IMF,
which he views as closely connected to the U.S. Treasury. He also acquits Argentina by blaming the U.S.,
saying Argentina "bought into the promises of U.S.-promoted 'neoliberalism,'" further shifting the
blame away from Argentina.

It is not the Argentine people that blame the IMF as much as It is their politicians. Alfonsm,
KIrchner, and Cavallo all blamed the IMF and international financial Institutions as the cause of the crisis.
While they have a point, it is not unexpected that some of the biggest supporters of this view are those
who were also in a position to affect the future of the country and have the most to gain by shifting
responsibility. The majority of Argentines blamed politicians more than the IMF because of the actions
of these politicians. The presidency of Carlos Menem and political corruption were stated as the biggest
reasons for the crisis, not the IMF.

The best way to understand the crisis is a combination of domestic politics, the state's federalist
structure, and external intervention along with an analysis of macroeconomic Indicators. This
examination does not absolve any party of responsibility; It does show that this crisis was the sum of a
number of parts. There was political corruption and mismanagement by politicians, but this in and of
itself would not be sufficient for a country like Argentina to default on over $150 billion worth of debt.
Federalism and national revenue sharing integral to the country's structural make-up played a role as
well as international financial institutions that enabled Argentina, both with their money and their poor
advice. Throughout much of the 1990s,the country was viewed as a low risk investment when some of
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those same financial institutions, like the IMF, now say the government was running unsustainable
policies.

Structurally, the power of the provinces and provincial governors hindered real political change.
The revenue sharing system, coparticipacidn, a structural agent, was used to further partisan goals. It
encouraged governors to spend money in ways which did not benefit the country. Funds were diverted
to help fellow party members and provincial budgets were expanded to pay for large, inefficient
provincial bureaucracies. Economic minister Domingo Cavallo, during his various tenures as minister.
was unable to effect lasting change in provincial spending as a result of the federalist system and the
way politics played out. To garner political support from the powerful provinces during Menem's
administration, things like this kind of reform were traded away. The irresponsible spending by the
government is reflected In the country's external debt -every year since 1994,the country's external
debt rose. The government, unable to control spending (at both the national and provincial levels), and
having a monetary policy that did not allow for the printing of money,the country indebted itself in
order to finance itself and maintain convertibility.

Closely related to the Ineffectiveness of the revenue sharing in the federalist structure is
Argentine domestic politics, or more specifically its clientelist nature. This was especially true when de
la Rua and his Alianza government came to power and faced an uncooperative PJ congress, but also to
some extent with Menem and the internal divisions of the PJ against his administration. The politics of
the country hindered real change, as tradeoffs were made to secure power;for example Menem's
agreement with the provinces to have provincial support at the cost of effecting change in the way
provincial budgets were allocated. The provinces also increased their spending during the 1990s so as to
finance their patronage. There was no sense of taking a course of action because It was what was best
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or needed, only a sense of doing so for one's self or party. Instead, political capital was spent in order to
further a certain party or province.

Corruption is also a part of this Inability of the political system to do what was best for the
country. Corruption in the Argentine case would be the use of one's position in government to enrich
oneself. Rampant during Menem's administration, it served politically to unite governing forces, a
person's position in government allowed one to steal money from state coffers and put these funds in
private accounts.^ Other examples involved the solicitation of bribes in the "Swiftgate" scandal and the
"Yomagate" scandal involving drug trafficking. The corruption present in Argentine politics took away
resources from the state and created government officials who in ways were working against the best
economic interests of the country.

Politically, President Menem in particular deserves his own mention in addition to general
Argentine political trends. As leader of the nation for io years and the majority of the time that
convertibility was in place, he is one part of the explanation for the crisis. Throughout his tenure as
president he was thought to be involved with the corruption taking place,though never implicated in it.
Additionally, he overstepped the checks and balances on the Executive frequently and bypassed
Congress with his "Decrees of Necessity and Urgency" to do things as he wanted, like privatizations. At
the end of his time in power, he ignored or failed to promote actions necessary to prevent a debt
increase. One example of this behavior was his desire to Increase the national budget in 1998,the year
in which the country started a recession. Additionally, he rejected proposed tax increases and spending
cuts that would help the economy

These actions represented a great challenge to the country and put

de la Rua's administration in a poor position to improve the economy.

Externally, Involvement of the IMF and other international financial institutions, at the very
least, set the country up for a harder fall and, at the most, actively damaged the country's economy.
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The extension of so many loans towards the end of convertibility served only to prop up a failing system
and provided for more foreign currency to be taken out of the country. The IMF Itself had doubts about
convertibility yet continued to extend loans to the country and continued to do so when policy
prescriptions were not being followed in full. The demand for policy implementation such as spending
austerity when the country was already In a recession (which Domingo Cavallo said was an "Idiotic"
idea)served to hurt the country more and keep the country in recession. It also set the country up for a
harder fall and Indebted the country even more with its emergency loans to keep the convertibility peg
working. The set up for this fall can be clearly seen in the amount of the IMF loans during the decade of
the 1990s. Initially, with the enactment of convertibility, the IMF increased its loans to the country
which then tapered off in the late 90s only to spike upwards dramatically in 2001 in Its attempt to
prevent default. The Fund had made a firm commitment to the continuation of the system and tried to
save" it.

IMF loans rose dramatically towards the very end of convertibility due to the Fund's
commitment to It, adding to Argentina's already sizeable external debt. In the case of Argentina,the
IMF's concentration on macroeconomic indicators as a measure of success was deceptive. In
comparison to the 1980s, convertibility created a very good economic outlook, yet by the time
convertibility began to show evidence that problems were on the horizon. The IMF avoided a situation
in which there would be short-term instability and in turn created a worse long-term situation for
Argentina. It tried to sustain the convertibility system at a time when it was already unstable. The IMF
could have helped Argentina ease out of what had come to be its convertibility stralghtjacket and
transition a devalued currency In a less abrupt and disastrous manner, had another plan been followed.
In the end,the IMF only increased the country's debt burden and worsened the impact on the country.
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It is ironic that the currency crisis came as a surprise, because those at the time who cared to
look at the macroeconomic picture would have seen a deteriorating economy. The countr/s external
debt was rising; trade and GDP were falling, putting the country into a recession three years before the
currency crisis occurred. The IMF was not looking at the country in economic terms, if they had;they
would have seen a country in decline and could have acted accordingly. Their viewpoint had changed
from one which concentrated on economics to a view with concerned itself with politics. The IMF's
actions were based on potential political outcomes and avoiding short-term economic crises, and less on
good, long-term macroeconomic outcomes.

The fiscal and monetary policy of the country is perhaps the cause from which all other factors
stem. Monetary policy, or more aptly, the currency peg is the root of the crisis. While the peg achieved
its goal of reducing inflation (In fact eliminating it totally some years),the policy's rigidity hurt
Argentina's economy. At the end of the 1990s, GDP,trade, and the country's balance of payments
began to decrease. The country could not maintain its competitive level with other countries(and their
currencies) due to such a fixed exchange rate. The continued adherence to this rate thus hurt the
economy, and other alternatives, such as a fixed rated based on a basket of currencies or a joint dollareuro peg, were ignored. Argentina's fiscal policy exacerbated the economic problems brought on by a
fixed monetary policy. With the country's money supply tied directly to the number of dollars It held,
the government had to find other ways to raise money or be relegated to spending only Its tax revenue.
The country's risk rating as well as its external debt is related to the creation of such a massive external
debt. As the rating improved,the more desirable an investment the country became and thus its
external debt increased as it sold more bonds to foreign Investors. This allowed state expenditures to
increase and was part of the problem with strictly following IMF policy prescriptions, which included
running budget surpluses.
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Macro-economically,factors such as the lack of trade and a falling GDP during the late 1990s
hurt the economy. Trade and GDP had grown steadily since the implementation of the peg and when
their levels stopped rising, this put the country into a bind. During the "boom" times,trade had come to
represent almost 25% of Argentina's GDP. The leveling off of this important part of the economy was an
effect of the currency peg which limited the country's competitiveness. This is also reflected in the
country's balance of payments sheet, which also declined in the late 1990s. In addition to trade, the
decline in the country's balance of payment Indicates a drop in the total amount of foreign currency
held, and with dollars being so integral to the well-being of the economy and the maintenance of the
currency peg. The damage caused by these changes in Argentina's economy,coupled with external
shocks, certainly hastened the emergence of the 2001 crisis.

In all, the clientelist nature of Argentine politics, mixed with a strong federal system that gave
provincial authorities a high degree of independence met external financial enablers like the IMF which
in the end Indebted the country to such a high degree. The politicians were the ones that did the things
which led up to the crisis, but they did not act in a political vacuum. Party politics changed the priorities
for the politicians, who tried to further the goals of the party and win re-election. President Menem Is
the perfect example of what was politically wrong with the country at the time. Corrupt, only
concerned with the maintenance of his power, and willing to change ideology, Menem exemplifies the
political problems In Argentina during the time period. The structure of Argentina's government, with
its system of coparticipacion, distributed the nation's wealth to be spent by provinces with no incentive
to rein in spending. External forces continued to lend money to the country even after internal
institutional debate revealed that doing so could be harmful. This Is ail reflected In the macroeconomic
statistics. External debt rose as the country's balance of payments went down. External economic
factors such as the 1999 devaluation of the Brazilian real hurt the country's ability to be competitive
abroad, and the 1994 Mexican Tequila crisis hurt Argentina's economy. So as much as the Argentine
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government and international organizations had a role in the crisis, these external events, beyond
Argentina's immediate influence, were Involved in bringing about the crisis.

The cause of the crisis was not political, nor was it the fault of strict economics; instead,the
cause of the crisis Is based In the interplay between these two factors. When looking macroeconomically at Argentina, while there were negatives such as a large external debt and several years of
recession, a bad macroeconomic picture would not be enough to produce a currency crisis. By that
same hand,the Argentine politicians and political system could not alone have brought about the crisis.
Yes, there was negligence on the politicians' part and the ingrained Argentine political culture did
nothing to deter this, but on its own, was not enough to cause the crisis. The currency crisis was not the
result of some kind of equation where poor fiscal policy plus large external debt equals a crisis, nor does
negligent politicians combined with certain structural elements equate to a crisis. How these two
Interplayed with each other is what caused the crisis. Negligent politicians did not respond to a
worsening macroeconomic picture, and the political process did not leave options to adequately
respond to the crisis. Convertibility was part of the problem, it tied the hands of policy makers
economically and its success made changing it politically unfavorable. Additionally, the involvement of
the IMF, who mixed politics and economics, serves as an example of this interplay. The currency crisis of
2001 cannot be explained by one side or the other. The two stories, the economic and the political.
would not exist without the other,they are inherently mixed when examining the crisis for the political
story does not fully explain the crisis, nor does the economic one. To understand the crisis, this hybrid
explanation serves the best to fully explain what happened,taking consideration of ail causes.
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